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INTRODUCTION
It may sound trivial, yet how we define accredited investor (AI) is critical.  
Among other things, U.S. securities laws and regulations make it easier for AIs 
to invest in privately held companies through “exempt offerings,” which are of-
ferings not “registered” under the 1933 Securities Act.1 This results in AIs hav-
ing investment opportunities that are unavailable to non-accredited investors 
(non-AIs).2 Moreover, the amount raised in exempt offerings has been increas-
ing both absolutely and relative to the amount raised in registered offerings.3 In 
fact, the Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance recently indicated 
that “[c]ompanies raised $2.9 trillion in private markets [in 2018], compared to 
$1.4 trillion in public markets . . . .”4 The importance of making more exempt 
offerings available to current non-AIs is frequently noted.5 Further, the pool of 
capital available to new ventures is essentially limited to the amount AIs are 
willing and able to invest.6 This is because it is too expensive for new ventures 
to participate in registered (i.e., public) offerings.7 It is also well established 
that these entrepreneurial ventures, which frequently need additional capital,8
1. See SEC Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 30,460, 30,470 (proposed Jun. 26, 2019) (to be codified at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 30,465.
4. Tom Zanki, Changes to Accredited Investor Rules Take Priority at SEC, LAW360 (Aug. 
13, 2019, 7:03 PM), https://www.law360.com/compliance/articles/1188099/changes-to-accredited-
investor-rules-take-priority-at-sec.
5. See, e.g., Dave Michaels, SEC Chairman Wants to Let More Main Street Investors in on 
Private Deals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2018, 4:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-
wants-to-let-more-main-street-investors-in-on-private-deals-1535648208 (“The Securities and Ex-
change Commission wants to make it easier for individuals to invest in private companies, including 
some of the world’s hottest startups, the agency’s chairman said in an interview.”). 
6. See Laura Anne Lindsey & Luke C.D. Stein, Angels, Entrepreneurship, and Employment 
Dynamics: Evidence from Investor Accreditation Rules 1 (Jan. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939994.
7. Companies have a choice when issuing their securities: (i) register the securities with the 
SEC or (ii) find an exemption from registration. See, e.g., PWC, CONSIDERING AN IPO TO FUEL 
YOUR COMPANY’S FUTURE? INSIGHT INTO THE COSTS OF GOING PUBLIC AND BEING PUBLIC 12 
(2017), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf. However, register-
ing securities with the SEC is cost prohibitive for new ventures. See id. at 5 (“The road to becoming 
a public company can be long and costly . . . almost 83% of CFOs participating in the survey indi-
cated that their firms spent more than $1million on one-time costs associated with the initial public 
offering.”). The costs of staying public are also problematic for new ventures. See id. at 14 (“In ad-
dition to the costs associated with going public—the offering and incremental organizational 
costs— there are significant expenses related to the process of being public . . . [t]wo-thirds of the 
CFOs surveyed estimated spending between $1 million and $1.9 million annually on the costs of 
being public.”).
8. See, e.g., VICTOR HWANG, SAMEEKSHA DESAI & ROSS BAIRD, ACCESS TO CAPITAL FOR 
ENTREPRENEURS: REMOVING BARRIERS 4 (2019), https://www.kauffman.org/what-we-
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have a significant impact on our economy.9 Thus, converting current non-AIs 
into AIs would create new investment opportunities, provide a much needed 
source of capital for entrepreneurial ventures, and have an economic impact.
To date, the AI definition has ignored the sophistication of individual inves-
tors.  Instead, it has focused solely on one’s net worth and income.10 Commen-
tators, including the SEC, have repeatedly noted potential shortcomings with 
this approach.11 But, the need to protect investors has provided the justification 
for tolerating these shortcomings.12 This Article argues that AI should be rede-
fined to welcome investors who demonstrate an ability to fend for themselves 
by passing a relevant exam.  More specifically, Part II of this Article reviews 
the current AI definition and population.  Part III provides examples of how the 
AI definition impacts investments in private companies and the secondary trad-
ing of such securities.  Part IV summarizes recent proposals to expand the cur-
rent AI definition.  Finally, Part V takes an in-depth look at one of the pro-
posals: letting investors test into AI status.  Part V also explains how such an 
exam could be linked to two other responsible ways to expand the AI pool: put-
ting investment limits on AIs and recognizing the value of experience gained by 
actually investing in exempt offerings.13
do/entrepreneurship/research/capital-landscape-report (“The vast majority of entrepreneurs need 
financing to assist with these start-up costs and to grow their businesses. Data from the 2016 Annual 
Survey of Entrepreneurs shows that only between 5 and 10 percent of businesses that have paid em-
ployees do not need financing at startup. Between 90 and 95 percent of entrepreneurs that hire, then, 
require some amount of financing to start their businesses.”) (footnote omitted).
9. See id. at 3 (“Entrepreneurship plays an important role in economic dynamism in the 
United States. Entrepreneurial ventures serve as the workhorse for the economy by contributing 
jobs, fueling innovation, and adding productivity. Startups in the United States less than one year 
old are especially important for net new job creation.” (footnote omitted)); see also U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Opinion Letter on Recommendations Regarding the Accredited Investor Definition 
(July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendations-accredited-
investor.pdf (Noting in consideration #2: “[e]merging companies play a significant role as drivers of 
U.S. economic activity, innovation and job creation. Their ability to raise capital in the unregistered 
securities markets is critical to the economic well-being of the United States.”).
10. Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Inves-
tor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 733–34 (2009).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See, e.g., Cydney Posner, What Happened at the Small Business Capital Formation 
Roundtable and Advisory Committee Meeting?, COOLEY PUBCO (May 6, 2019), 
https://cooleypubco.com/2019/05/06/small-business-roundtable-and-committee-meeting/ (“At the 
Small Business Capital Formation Advisory Committee, SEC Chair Jay Clayton stressed the im-
portance of allowing retail investors to participate in early stage investments; however, from an in-
vestor protection standpoint, a key is to ensure that the interests of retail investors are aligned with 
those of management and the institutional investors.”). But see U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra 
note 9 (Noting in consideration #7: “[s]ome commentators have urged that the accredited investor 
thresholds be increased in order to prevent fraud against investors who may be unable to fend for 
themselves. The Committee is not aware of any evidence suggesting that fraud in the private mar-
kets is driven or affected by the levels at which the accredited investor definition is set.”).
13. See infra Part IV.D.
178 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 9:175
I. CURRENT ACCREDITED INVESTOR DEFINITION AND POPULATION
The AI definition is set forth in Rule 501(a) of Regulation D under the Se-
curities Act of 1933.14 Rule 501(a) provides for several categories of AIs, in-
cluding banks, organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, trusts, and other entities that meet the applicable asset or other re-
requirement(s). 15 However, for natural persons (i.e., individual investors), 
whether one is an AI will almost always boil down to the amount of his/her net 
worth or income.16 More specifically, under Rule 501(a)(5), an AI includes: 
“[a]ny natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that 
person’s spouse, exceeds $1,000,000”17 provided that “[t]he person’s primary 
residence shall not be included as an asset”18 and “[i]ndebtedness that is secured 
by the person’s primary residence, up to the estimated fair market value of the 
primary residence at the time of the sale of securities, shall not be included as a 
liability . . . .”19 Thus, under this “Net Worth Threshold” one’s net worth must 
exceed $1 million, excluding the value of the equity in his/her residence.  
Moreover, under Rule 501(a)(6)’s “Income Thresholds,” an AI includes: “[a]ny 
natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of 
the two most recent years or joint income with that person’s spouse in excess of 
$300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching 
the same income level in the current year.”20
The SEC estimates that 9.4% of U.S. households qualify as AIs by meeting 
the Net Worth Threshold while 8.9% and 4.6% of U.S. households qualify as 
AIs under the individual and joint Income Thresholds, respectively.21 Overall, 
the SEC estimates that 13% of U.S. households qualify as AIs. 22 Because 
household net worth and incomes tend to be much higher in the Northeast and 
West, more AIs are located in those two regions (when compared to the Mid-
west and South).23 Importantly, 13% is an estimate of the total pool of AIs in 
14. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (Westlaw through 85 FR 11270).
15. Id.
16. See id. But see 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (Westlaw through 85 FR 11270) (indicating 
“[a]ny director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities being offered or 
sold, or any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer” is in-
cluded in the definition of AI regardless of whether the individual meets the requirements of a natu-
ral person in Rule 501(a)(5)).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (Westlaw through 85 FR 11270).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1, at 
30,471.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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the U.S. only a small portion of this total pool actually invests in exempt offer-
ings.24
Moreover, AIs who are natural persons who invest in new ventures, often 
called angel investors or “angels,” play a unique role in the entrepreneurial fi-
nance ecosystem.  This is because venture capital (VC) is not an easy substitute 
for angel investments, even in sectors where VC is active.25 Similarly, banks 
are an imperfect substitute for angel investments.26 Therefore, as the number of 
natural persons who are AIs increases or decreases, the amount of capital avail-
able to entrepreneurs should also increase or decrease, respectively, since other 
funding sources are poor substitutes for angel investments.27
To summarize, the current AI definition uses only financial criteria (i.e., net 
worth and income levels) to determine whether natural persons are AIs.  No 
consideration whatsoever is given to other factors such as one’s education, pro-
fessional certifications, or experience.  Therefore, private companies can raise 
capital from clueless individuals who are rich but not from middle class indi-
viduals who are financially sophisticated, even if these individuals get paid to 
make decisions for prestigious VC firms or advise wealthy individuals on pri-
vate company investments.28 Moreover, under the current AI definition, 87% of 
U.S. households are non-AIs and, of the 13% of households that do qualify as 
AIs, only a small fraction is likely to actually participate in exempt offerings.29
Further, the amount of capital available to many entrepreneurial ventures de-
pends on the number of these participating households since other traditional 
capital sources, such as VC funds and banks, are unlikely to provide alternative 
financing.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCREDITED INVESTOR DEFINITION
Under existing securities laws, there are several ways the AI definition im-
pacts the number of investment opportunities available to natural persons and 
the amount of capital available to entrepreneurial ventures.  This Part II pro-
vides specific examples of how the AI definition relates to primary offerings 
(i.e., when issuing companies sell securities directly to individual investors), 
secondary offerings (i.e., when individual investors sell securities to each oth-
er), and other situations involving securities laws.  These examples should help 
illustrate the current, real-world implications of the AI definition.
24. Id.; see also Posner, supra note 12 (referring to an estimate that only “300,000 out of 
10M eligible accredited investors” (i.e., only 3% of AIs) actually participate in private investments).
25. Lindsey & Stein, supra note 6, at 4.
26. Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 8.
28. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 279, 310 (2000).
29. See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1;
see Posner, supra note 14.
180 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 9:175
A. Primary Offerings
Regulation D originated as an effort to facilitate capital formation while 
protecting investors.30 In 1982, the SEC adopted Rule 506 of Regulation D to 
provide objective standards on which issuers can rely to meet the requirements 
of the Section 4(a)(2) exemption from registration.31 Prior to the JOBS Act, is-
suers relying on the Rule 506 exemption could not attract potential investors 
through a general solicitation (i.e., advertising).32 However, in 2012, Section 
201(a) of the JOBS Act required the SEC to permit general solicitations under 
Rule 506 in cases where all purchasers of the securities are AIs and the issuer 
takes “reasonable steps” to verify that the purchasers are AIs.33 This resulted in 
Rule 506 essentially splitting into two separate exemptions: the Rule 506(b) ex-
emption, which does not permit issuers to engage in advertising, and the Rule 
506(c) exemption, which permits issuers to engage in advertising but only al-
lows sales to AIs and requires issuers to take the aforementioned reasonable 
steps.34 Both of these exemptions are significant.  For example, Rule 506(b) 
dominates the market of exempt offerings and, in 2018, more capital was raised 
under Rule 506(b) alone than was raised pursuant to registered offerings. 35
Moreover, while Rule 506(c) offerings are not as popular as Rule 506(b) offer-
ings, issuers raised $466.4 billion under Rule 506(c) from September 23, 2013 
(the date Rule 506(c) offerings became effective) through December 31, 2018.36
Further, as stated above, Rule 506(c) offerings give issuers a unique tool—the 
30. See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1
at 30,480.
31. See id. at 30,480 & nn. 185–86.
32. See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1.
33. Id. With respect to the Income Threshold, issuers can comply with the “reasonable steps”
requirement by reviewing IRS tax forms reporting a purchaser’s income for the two most recent 
fiscal years and obtaining a written representation that he/she has a reasonable expectation of reach-
ing the required income level during the current year. See Keeping Current: SEC Staff Issues Guid-
ance on Verifying Accredited Investor Status, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/08/keeping_current/ (cit-
ing Rule 506(c)(2)(ii)(A)). With respect to the Net Worth Threshold, issuers must review specified 
documentation evidencing the purchaser’s assets and liabilities dated within the prior three months 
and obtain a written purchaser representation that all liabilities necessary to make a determination of 
net worth have been disclosed. Id. (citing Rule 506(c)(2)(ii)(B)). While issuers desire to use “safe-
guards” like these for purposes of clarity and certainty (i.e., there is certainty purchasers will be 
considered AIs, and thus permit reliance on the Rule 506(c) exemption), there are burdens associat-
ed with these methods to verify AI status and purchasers have legitimate privacy concerns. See, e.g.,
Concept Release on Harmonization  of Securities  Offering  Exemptions, supra note 1, at 30,482–
83; see also Peter Rasmussen, Analysis: Rule 506(c)’s General Solicitation Remains Generally Dis-
appointing, BLOOMBERG ANALYSIS (May 26, 2017), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-
law-analysis/analysis-rule-506cs-general-solicitation-remains-generally-disappointing.
34. See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1,
at 30,480–85.
35. Id. at 30,484 (“In 2018, the amount raised by Rule 506(b) offerings, $1.5 trillion, was 
larger than the $1.4 trillion raised in registered offerings.”).
36. Id. at 30,484 tbl. 6.
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ability to advertise exempt offerings to the public (even though actual sales can 
only be to AIs).37 One benefit of Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c) offerings is that 
issuers using these exemptions are not required to register or qualify the offer-
ings with state securities regulators (i.e., any such state law requirements are 
“preempted” with respect to issuances of these “covered securities”).38
Because sales under Rule 506(c) can only be to AIs, the AI definition has 
strong implications for Rule 506(c).  That is, the universe of AIs is also the uni-
verse of potential purchasers in Rule 506(c) offerings.39 However, the AI defi-
nition also has implications for Rule 506(b) offerings.  While Rule 506(b) per-
mits sales to AIs and up to 35 non-AIs, disclosure requirements (i.e.,
information issuers must furnish when raising capital) become more extensive if 
any non-AIs are included in the offering.40 Thus, a vast majority of issuers limit 
their Rule 506(b) offerings exclusively to AIs in order to avoid the additional 
disclosure requirements and the associated costs.41 In fact, non-AIs only partic-
ipated in “approximately 6% of Rule 506(b) offerings in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 
2018, which offerings reported raising between two and three percent of the to-
tal capital raised under Rule 506(b) in each of 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018.”42
Therefore, converting non-AIs to AIs should make Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c) 
offerings even more widespread.
Rule 506 offerings are not the only primary offering exemptions impacted 
by the AI definition.  Regulation A provides another example of how the AI 
definition effects primary offerings.  Regulation A, originally adopted by the 
SEC in 1936, was amended by Section 401 of the JOBS Act.43 On March 25, 
2015, the SEC adopted final rules to implement Section 401 by creating two ti-
ers of Regulation A offerings: Tier 1, for up to $20 million in a 12-month peri-
od; and Tier 2, for up to $50 million in a 12-month period.44 Moreover, there 
are no restrictions on resale for securities sold in either a Tier 1 or Tier 2 offer-
ing.45 Further, while Tier 2 offerings are subject to additional Federal filing and 
reporting requirements when compared to Tier 1 offerings, they (like Rule 506 
offerings) preempt state registration and qualification requirements.46 This state 
preemption makes Tier 2 offerings attractive to issuers.  However, unlike AIs, 
37. Supra note 33.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(F) (2019).
39. Thus, expanding or contracting the size of the AI population causes an equal change to 
the population of potential participants in Rule 506(c) offerings.
40. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2019).
41. See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1,
at 30,484.
42. Id. (footnote omitted).
43. Id. at 30,486 (footnotes omitted).
44. Id. at 30,486–87 (citing Regulation A, 80 Fed. Reg. 21806 (April 20, 2015) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260)); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.251.
45. Id. at 30,487.
46. Id. at 30,491.
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non-AIs are limited as to how much they can invest in a Tier 2 offering.  Specif-
ically, non-AIs participating in a Tier 2 offering can invest no more than: (a) 
10% of the greater of annual income or net worth (for natural persons); or (b) 
10% of the greater of annual revenue or net assets at fiscal year-end (for non-
natural persons).47 Thus, to the extent non-AIs convert to AIs, the amount of 
capital available for Regulation A, Tier 2 offerings will increase.48
B. Secondary Offerings
While primary offerings are critical to entrepreneurial ventures, secondary 
offerings are also important.  Among other things, as it becomes easier for in-
vestors to resell their private company stock, they are more likely to: (i) invest 
in primary offerings in the first place, (ii) diversify their portfolios, and (iii) re-
allocate their capital to more attractive investment opportunities.49 Similarly, 
increased liquidity makes it easier for businesses to attract capital and at a lower
cost.50 However, in order to resell their securities, investors must either register 
(or have the issuer register) the transaction or have an exemption from registra-
tion.51 As was the case with primary offerings, exemptions and the AI defini-
tion are both important with respect to resales.  Two specific examples of the AI 
definition’s impact on secondary offerings are provided in this Part II.B: resales 
of Regulation Crowdfunding securities and resales relying on the Section 
4(a)(7) exemption.
In 2012, Title III of the JOBS Act provided a new exemption from registra-
tion by adding Section 4(a)(6) to the Securities Act.52 To implement Title III, 
47. 17 C.F.R 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C); see also Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities 
Offering Exemptions, supra note 1 (this limit does not apply to purchases of securities listed on a 
national securities exchange).
48. The author is not suggesting current non-AIs who convert to AIs should typically put 
more than 10% of the greater of their annual income or net worth into a Tier 2 offering. Neverthe-
less, the ability to do so (and thus the total amount of potential capital available for such offerings) 
will hinge on whether one is an AI.
49. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opinion Letter on Recommendation Regarding Sec-
ondary Market Liquidity for Regulation A, Tier 2 Securities (May 15, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-051517-secondary-liquidity-
recommendation.pdf (noting consideration (ii): “[s]econdary market liquidity is integral to capital 
formation. Small businesses trying to attract capital often struggle because potential backers are 
reluctant to invest unless they are confident there will be an exit opportunity. Capital is often more 
expensive or not available for issuers that are not able to provide investors with secondary market 
liquidity. Also, securities lacking an available market generally bear an illiquidity discount on val-
ue.” Further, noting consideration (iii): “[l]imited possibilities for liquidity means investors’ capital 
may be locked up longer than they would like, hindering their ability to build portfolios with multi-
ple, diverse investments. Liquidity limitations also prevent capital from being put to use in the next 
investment.”).
50. Id.
51. See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1
at 30,517.
52. See 15 U.S.C. 77d(a)(6).
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the SEC adopted “Regulation Crowdfunding,” which became effective on May 
16, 2016.53 To qualify for the exemption, several requirements must be met in-
cluding: (i) limits on the amount issuers can raise; (ii) limits on the amount peo-
ple may invest; (iii) the transactions must be conducted through a registered in-
termediary; and (iv) the issuers and intermediaries must provide information to 
the purchasers and the SEC.54 Regulation Crowdfunding also provides an ex-
ample of how the AI definition impacts secondary offerings.  Specifically, secu-
rities purchased in a Regulation Crowdfunding transaction generally cannot be 
resold for a period of one year, unless, the securities are sold to an AI or a lim-
ited number of other permitted transferees.55 Thus, increasing the number of 
AIs would increase the number of permitted transferees for the one-year period 
and thus increase the liquidity of secondary markets.
In 2015, the FAST Act created a new statutory exemption for resales of se-
curities by adding Section 4(a)(7) to the Securities Act.56 In addition to provid-
ing a Federal exemption, Section 4(a)(7) preempts state registration and qualifi-
cation requirements.57 However, the Section 4(a)(7) resale exemption is only 
available when the purchaser is an AI. 58 Therefore, while several other re-
quirements of Section 4(a)(7) must still be met,59 increasing the number of AIs 
53. See Crowdfunding Release, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 274).
54. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100.
55. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.501. Other permitted transferees include the issuer, the purchaser’s
family members, and certain trusts; moreover, transfers are also permitted if made as part of a regis-
tered offering, or in connection with the death or divorce of the purchaser. See id.
56. See SEC Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra
note 1, at 30,519; see also Albert Lung & Joanne R. Soslow, Federal Securities Law Implications of 
the FAST Act, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.morganlewis.com/
pubs/federal-securities-law-implications-of-the-fast-act.
57. Id.
58. Id. Without this preemption, an investor seeking to resell securities would also need to 
comply with any State securities registration and qualification requirements.
59. Further, securities acquired under Section 4(a)(7) are “restricted securities” and cannot 
be further transferred without registration or another exemption. See Concept Release on Harmoni-
zation of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1, at 30,519 (also summarizing six additional 
requirements of Section 4(a)(7): “[1] Neither the seller, nor any person acting on its behalf, uses any 
form of general solicitation or advertising; [2] Neither the seller nor any person who has been or 
will be paid for its participation in the transaction is a “bad actor” under Rule 506(d); [3] The issuer 
is engaged in business, not in the organizational stage or in bankruptcy or receivership, and is not a 
blank check, blind pool, or shell company that has no specific business plan or purpose and has not 
indicated that its primary business plan is to engage in a merger with an unidentified person; [4] The 
transaction does not relate to an unsold allotment to, or a subscription or participation by, a broker 
or dealer as an underwriter of the securities; [5] The securities have been authorized and outstanding 
for at least 90 days; and [6] If the issuer of the securities is not subject to the reporting requirements 
of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, a variety of specified information must be provided to 
prospective purchasers, including the issuer’s most recent balance sheet and statement of profit and 
loss and similar financial statements for the two preceding fiscal years, prepared in accordance with 
U.S. GAAP or, in the case of a foreign private issuer, International Financial Reporting Standards 
(‘IFRS’).”).
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would increase the number of potential participants in, and thus the liquidity of, 
the secondary market.
C. Other Situations
The AI definition also impacts other aspects of federal and state securities 
laws.  For example, it is part of the threshold that determines when companies 
must register under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Ex-
change Act”).60 Even if a company carefully raises funds pursuant to exempt 
offerings, and thereby avoids a costly registration under the Securities Act, it 
will have to register under the Exchange Act once certain thresholds are ex-
ceeded.  More specifically, most types of issuers are required to register securi-
ties under the Exchange Act, if the company has more than $10 million of total 
assets and the securities are “held of record” by either 2,000 persons or 500 per-
sons who are not AIs.61 Thus, a company with over $10 million in total assets 
and a capitalization table showing only 499 non-AIs holding shares of stock 
could issue additional shares to up to 1,500 new stockholders, without trigger-
ing an Exchange Act registration and its associated costs,62 provided the new 
stockholders are all AIs.63
By way of further example, several state securities laws and regulations al-
ready piggyback off the SEC’s AI definition.  For instance, the North American 
Securities Administrators Association’s (NASAA’s) Model Accredited Investor 
Exemption, which was adopted in 1997, exempts securities from state registra-
tion requirements.  However, the model exemption requires, among other 
things, that the securities are sold only to AIs.64
Thus, changes to the (Federal/SEC’s) AI definition will also automatically 
impact issuers and investors at the state level, to the extent they are subject to 
those state laws and regulations.65
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1.
61. See id. However, in the case of a bank, a savings and loan holding company, or bank 
holding company, the company is not required to register until it has more than $10 million of total 
assets and its securities are held of record by 2,000 or more persons (regardless of whether they are 
AIs or non-AIs). Id.
62. PWC DEALS, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
63. Also, securities issued pursuant to Regulation Crowdfunding are conditionally exempted 
from the stockholder count, for purposes of Section 12(g), if the company has total assets of $25 
million or less and certain other conditions are satisfied. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-6.
64. See Commission Notice: Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securities Laws, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (March 10, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-7808.htm (Per Sec-
tion III(A)(2) and footnote 10 thereto, “[t]he term ‘accredited investor,’ [is] as defined by the Secu-
rities Act and the Commission’s rules under the Act.”).
65. That is, to the extent state laws and regulations already provide exemptions (or other 
favorable treatment) when AIs are involved, no state action would be required to have an impact at 
the state level since state laws and regulations simply utilize the AI definition of the federal gov-
ernment and the SEC.
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III. CALLS TO EXPAND THE ACCREDITED INVESTOR DEFINITION
Because of both the shortcomings and importance of the current AI defini-
tion, several individuals and organizations have called to expand it by adding 
criteria other than one’s income and net worth.  This Part III provides examples 
of initiatives to expand the AI definition and summarizes some of the proposals 
for how this might be done.
A. SEC-Related Initiatives
On August 13, 2019, an SEC director announced that updating the AI defi-
nition is a “top priority,” given its important role in shaping the market for pri-
vate placements.66 This should not be a surprise.  The 2018 SEC Government-
Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation made expanding the AI 
definition the number one priority in its Consolidated Forum Recommendations 
(SEC Forum Recommendations).67 This should not have been a shocker either 
since earlier SEC Forum Recommendations also made expanding the AI defini-
tion the number one priority in 2015,68 2016,69 and 2017.70 Moreover, in its 
2015 Report on the Review of the Definition of “Accredited Investor,” SEC 
staff recommended the Commission “revise the accredited investor definition to 
allow individuals to qualify as accredited investors based on other measures of 
sophistication.”71 Further, the SEC Advisory Committee on Small and Emerg-
ing Markets, which morphed into the Small Business Capital Formation Advi-
sory Committee, has repeatedly recommended the SEC expand the pool of AIs 
(SEC AC Recommendations).72 While the opportunity to expand the AI defini-
66. See Zanki, supra note 4 (“Bill Hinman, director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation 
Finance, said updating the definition of an ‘accredited investor’ is a top priority . . . .”).
67. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2018 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL 
BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION: FINAL REPORT 17 (June 2019), https://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/gbfor37.pdf (showing expansion of the definition of AI ranked first of ten priorities).
68. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2015 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL
BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION: FINAL REPORT 23 (Apr. 2018), https://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/gbfor34.pdf (showing expansion of the definition of AI ranked first of fourteen priorities).
69. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL 
BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION: FINAL REPORT 16 (Mar. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/gbfor35.pdf (showing expansion of the definition of AI ranked first of fifteen priorities).
70. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2017 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL 
BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION: FINAL REPORT 17 (Mar. 2018), https://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/gbfor36.pdf (showing expansion of the definition of AI ranked first of twenty priorities).
71. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF 
“ACCREDITED INVESTOR” 7 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/reportspubs/special-studies/
review-definition-of-accredited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF 
THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR”].
72. See Posner, supra note 12 (“In 2015 and 2016, the SEC Committee on Small and Emerg-
ing Companies (which then morphed into the Small Business Capital Formation Advisory Commit-
tee), urged the SEC to ‘do no harm’ with regard to the accredited investor definition. . .[t]he com-
mittee expressed its support for ‘expanding the definition to take into account measures of 
sophistication, regardless of income or net worth, thereby expanding rather than contracting the pool 
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tion has clearly been brought to the SEC’s attention over the years (even by its 
own staff, committees, and leadership),73 rules defining an AI have been largely 
untouched since 1982.74
B. Fair Investment Opportunities for Professional Experts Act
As one practitioner points out, the Fair Investment Opportunities for Profes-
sional Experts Act reflects the House of Representatives’ (House’s) impatience 
with the SEC’s failure to revise the AI definition to increase the potential pool 
of investors for the private placement market.75 In short, the House bill (H.R. 
2187) would have directed the SEC to revise its own regulations regarding the 
AI definition.76 On February 1, 2016, the House passed H.R. 2187 by a vote of 
347 to 8.77 After dying in the Senate,78 H.R. 2187 was reborn as H.R. 1585 
(which was also named the Fair Investment Opportunities for Professional Ex-
perts Act) and approved by the House on November 1, 2017.79 However, like 
of accredited investors.’”); see also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 9 (recommending ex-
pansion of the AI definition via recommendations #1 through #4); Recommendations Regarding the 
Accredited Investor Definition, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 9, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-accredited-investor-definition-recommendation-
030415.pdf (recommending expansion of the AI definition via recommendation #1); U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Final Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on 
Small and Emerging Companies (Sept. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-final-
report-2017-09.pdf (supporting expansion of the AI definition on page 12) [hereinafter Final Report 
of SEC Advisory Committee].
73. See, e.g., supra notes 67–72; see also, H.R. REP. NO. 115-375 at 4 (Oct. 31, 2017) (“At 
an October 4, 2017 Financial Services Committee hearing, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton agreed that 
the definition of accredited investor should be reconsidered and testified that he did not care for the 
binary nature of the current definition. Expanding the accredited investor definition not only bene-
fits the companies raising funds but also provides investors with more attractive investment oppor-
tunities. As SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar has astutely observed, allowing retail investors to 
invest in both public and private companies can actually have the effect of reducing risk in their 
overall portfolio.”).
74. See Zanki, supra note 4 (“Current rules defining an accredited investor are based strictly 
on wealth and have been largely untouched since 1982.”).
75. See Park S. Bramhall, House Passes Bill to Expand Accredited Investor Definition, 
LOWENSTEIN SANDLER LLP (Feb. 2016), https://www.lowenstein.com/media/3208/house-passes-
bill-to-expand-accredited-investor-definition.pdf (“As indicated in the debate that immediately pre-
ceded the adoption of HR 2187 and the report of the House’s Financial Services Committee that 
accompanied it . . . HR 2187 reflects both the House’s impatience with the SEC’s failure to revise 
the accredited investor definition to increase the potential pool of investors for the private placement 
market and its desire to prevent the SEC from imposing any restrictions that would have the oppo-
site effect.”).
76. See Fair Investment Opportunities for Professional Experts Act, H.R. 2187, 114th Cong.
(2015), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2187.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Fair Investment Opportunities for Professional Experts Act, H.R. 1585, 115th Cong. 
(2017), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr1585.
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its predecessor H.R. 2187, H.R. 1585 was never passed by the Senate.80 While 
action by Congress could have brought about change, the SEC already has the 
authority to expand the AI definition.81
C. Other Calls for Expansion
Many others have also demonstrated support for expanding the AI defini-
tion.  For example, in October 2017, the U.S. Department of the Treasury pub-
lished a report recommending, among other things, expanding the pool of AIs.82
Further, in response to its 2015 staff report, the SEC received several comment 
letters from industry groups, academia, and others showing support for various 
ways of expanding the AI definition.83
D. Suggestions for How to Expand the Accredited Investor Definition
When making calls to expand the AI definition, some of the above refer-
enced commentators also suggested how to do so.  Proposals included adding 
the following types of natural persons to the AI pool:
• Individuals who have certain educational backgrounds;84
• Individuals who have certain business experiences and professional 
credentials/certifications;85
• Individuals who invest minimum amounts;86
• Individuals who have experience investing in exempt offerings;87
80. Id.
81. See 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(15)(ii) (2012) (noting that AIs shall include “any person who, on 
the basis of such factors as financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in finan-
cial matters, or amount of assets under management qualifies as an accredited investor under rules 
and regulations which the Commission shall prescribe.”)
82. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS 44 (2017) (“Treasury recommends that amendments to the 
accredited investor definition be undertaken with the objective of expanding the eligible pool of 
sophisticated investors.”) [hereinafter A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS].
83. See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1,
at 30,473–77.
84. See, e.g., Fair Investment Opportunities for Professional Experts Act, H.R. 1585, 115th 
Cong. (2017) (empowering the SEC to determine what constitutes suitable education, while also 
requiring verification of one’s education by FINRA or an equivalent self-regulatory organization); 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 71, at 58.
85. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR,”
supra note 71, at 8, 58–61, 94–95. H.R. 1585 would add (i) natural persons who are “currently li-
censed or registered as a broker or investment adviser by the [SEC], [FINRA], or an equivalent self-
regulatory organization . . . or the securities division of a State” and (ii) more natural persons the 
SEC determines to have suitable experience provided such experience is “verified by [FINRA] or an 
equivalent self-regulatory organization.” See H.R. 1585, 115th Cong. (2017).
86. REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR,” supra note 
71, at 8, 94.
87. Id. at 8, 62–64, 95.
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• Individuals who are knowledgeable employees of issuers or private 
funds;88
• Individuals who are advised by professionals;89
• Individuals who stay within investment limits;90 and
• Individuals who pass an AI examination.91
Commentators also noted the importance of simplicity and being able to as-
certain any criteria with certainty (i.e., having bright line tests as opposed to us-
ing a principles-based approach when making AI or non-AI determinations).92
While many of these proposals show promise, the author believes the AI exam 
is the superior approach for at least five reasons:
1. It could be tailored to assess appropriate topics (and thus more rele-
vant than credentials or certifications demonstrating knowledge of tra-
ditional accounting topics or finance theories, for instance);
2. It could educate investors on best practices and thus encourage smarter 
deals;
3. It could provide certainty to issuers and others (i.e., one must pass the 
AI exam);
4. It could assess whether individuals with education and/or experience 
are truly experts; and
5. It could be linked to other criteria—e.g., utilizing investment limits 
and considering exempt offering experience.
IV. THE ACCREDITED INVESTOR EXAM
This Part IV looks more closely at what an AI exam might look like.  First, 
several examinations suggested by the above initiatives are noted and, for three 
of the items, particular exam topics are summarized.  Second, characteristics 
and practices of VCs are considered.  Third, the author suggests the AI exam 
should not expect test takers to have all of the answers themselves.  Instead, it 
should enable test takers to spot areas where knowledge gaps and other risks are 
likely to exist and empower them to seek help to mitigate some of those risks 
and consider the others.  Finally, this Part IV explores the idea of linking the AI 
exam to investment limits and/or relevant experience.
88. Id. at 8, 64–65, 95–96.
89. Id. at 61–62; see also A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES:
CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 82, at 44.
90. See, e.g., Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra
note 1, at 30,475.
91. REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR,” supra note 
71, at 8, 65–67, 96.
92. See, e.g., Final Report of SEC Advisory Committee, supra note 72, at 12.
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A. Summary of Existing Exam-Focused Proposals
Several proposals have been made that relate to a potential AI exam.  In-
stead of referencing specific examinations, some proposals require one to be-
come a licensed professional that would first require the individual to pass an 
exam (or exams) and possibly complete additional steps.93 These licensed pro-
fessionals include: brokers or investment advisors licensed by the SEC, FINRA 
(or an equivalent self-regulatory organization), or a state securities division;94
Certified Financial Analysts (CFAs), Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), and 
Certified Financial Planners (CFPs); 95 Certified Managerial Accountants 
(CMAs);96 and attorneys.97 Other proposals reference specific tests, including 
the Series 7, Series 65, and Series 82 examination.98 However, it is unclear 
whether/how any non-exam requirements typically coupled with these exams 
would be waived.99 To provide concrete examples of potential test subjects, 
Part IV.A looks at exam criteria referenced in the first draft of the Fair Invest-
ment Opportunities for Professional Experts Act.  It then looks more closely at 
two exams called out as potential models for an AI exam in the SEC Staff Re-
port: FINRA’s Series 7 and Series 82 examinations.100
1.  Initial Draft of Fair Investment Opportunities for Professional Experts Act
Specific exam topics were listed out in the first version of H.R. 2178 
(which, again, became H.R. 1585).101 The initial draft of H.R. 2178 directed the 
SEC to establish criteria for FINRA to use in administering an exam to license 
93. For example, some professions will require exam takers to also work for a period of time 
and/or be associated with other professionals who already hold the applicable license.
94. See H.R. 1585, 115th Cong. (2017) at 3–4.
95. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR,”
supra note 71, at 59–60.
96. See, e.g., Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra
note 1, at 30,475.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR,”
supra note 71, at 95.
99. For example, exam candidates must be associated with and sponsored by a FINRA 
member firm, or other applicable self-regulatory organization member firm, to be eligible to take 
FINRA exams. See FINRA, Series 7 – General Securities Representative Exam,
https://www.finra.org/industry/series7 (last visited Sept. 5, 2019). By way of further example, can-
didates who take the Series 7 Examination must also pass the Securities Industry Essentials (SIE) 
exam to obtain the General Securities Representative registration. See id.
100. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR,”
supra note 71, at 96.
101. Fair Investment Opportunities for Professional Experts Act, H.R. 2187, 114th Cong. § 3 
(2015), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr2187/BILLS-114hr2187ih.pdf (the initial version of 
H.R. 2187 as introduced to the House on Apr. 30, 2015).
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natural persons not already meeting the AI’s Net Worth or Income Thresh-
olds.102 More specifically, it stated:
Such criteria may include methods for assuring that licensed accredited in-
vestors demonstrate a competency in understanding the following:
(1) The different types of securities.
(2) The disclosure obligations under the securities laws of issuers versus 
private companies [sic].
(3) The structures of corporate governance.
(4) The components of a financial statement.
(5) Other criteria the Commission shall establish in the public interest and 
for the protection of investors.103
While the above text was not included in the version of the H.R. 2178 that 
passed the House by a vote of 347 to 8 on February 1, 2016,104 it provides in-
sights into topics an AI exam might cover.105
2.  FINRA’s Series 82 Examination
The Series 82 exam, named the Private Securities Offerings Representative 
Qualification Examination, assesses the competency of entry-level registered 
representatives to perform their job as private securities offerings representa-
tives.106 A candidate who passes the Series 82 exam is deemed qualified for the 
solicitation and sale of private placement securities products as part of a prima-
ry offering.107 As its name suggests, the exam tests knowledge in several areas 
relevant to exempt offerings, including:
• Private offerings exemptions from registration and classes of securi-
ties;
• Feasibility studies and due diligence (e.g., the components of due dili-
gence: financial, industry and operational data, management and em-
ployee relations, research, product development and expansion);
• Special issues dealing with electronic offerings;
• Pricing offerings;
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Fair Investment Opportunities for Professional Experts Act, H.R. 2187, 114th Cong. 
(2016), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr2187/BILLS-114hr2187eh.pdf (the engrossed version 
of the bill as passed by the House on Feb. 1, 2016); Actions Overview H.R.2187—114th Congress
(2015–2016), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/housebill/2187/
actions.
105. While H.R. 2187 eventually died in Congress, it was reintroduced (and again approved 
by the House) on Nov. 1, 2017 as H.R. 1585. However, like H.R. 2187, H.R. 1585 did not obtain 
Senate approval. See supra Part III.B.
106. FINRA, Series 82 – Private Securities Offerings Representative Exam,
https://www.finra.org/industry/series82 (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) [hereinafter FINRA, Series 82].
107. Id.
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• Regulation A offerings;
• Financial factors relevant to assessing investment profile (e.g., securi-
ty holdings, other assets and liabilities, annual income, net worth, tax 
considerations, home ownership and financing, employee stock op-
tions, insurance, liquidity needs);
• Tax consequences of securities transactions (e.g., holding period, ba-
sis, dividends, interest income);
• Verification of investor accreditation and sophistication;
• Ability to understand risks of the underlying investment;
• Equity and debt instruments in the context of private placements;
• Concentration of investment in a small number of issues versus diver-
sification;
• Convertibility of securities (including the value of the conversion fea-
ture and the effect of potential forced conversion);
• Transaction disclosure requirements; and
• Methods of formal resolution (e.g., arbitration, mediation, litiga-
tion).108
The Series 82 exam consists of 50 multiple choice items and candidates have 90 
minutes to complete it.109 They must take the exam at one of many Prometric 
test centers.110 In order to pass, candidates must score at least 70%.111 It costs 
$40 to sit for the exam.112
3.  FINRA’s Series 7 Examination
The Series 7 exam, named the General Securities Representative Qualifica-
tion Examination, assesses the competency of entry-level registered representa-
tives to perform their job as general securities representatives.113 A candidate 
who passes the Series 7 exam is deemed qualified for the solicitation, purchase 
and/or sale of all securities products.114 Despite its more general coverage, the 
108. FINRA, Private Securities Offerings Representative Qualification Examination (Series 
82) – Content Outline, https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Series_82_Content_Outline.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2019).
109. See FINRA, Series 82, supra note 106.
110. Schedule an Exam, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/industry/schedule-exam. Per its web-
site, Prometric operates a network of 8,000 test centers in more than 160 countries and offers a wide 
selection of times and dates for testing. See About Prometric, PROMETRIC,
https://www.prometric.com/about-us/about-prometric (last visited Sept. 5, 2019).
111. See FINRA, Series 82, supra note 106.
112. Id.
113. See supra note 99.
114. Id.
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Series 7 exam tests knowledge in several areas relevant to exempt offerings, in-
cluding:115
• Requirements for initial public offerings, Regulation A offerings, Regu-
lation D offerings, and other exempt securities and transactions;
• Regulatory requirements for resales;
• Financial factors relevant to assessing investment profile (e.g., security 
holdings, other assets and liabilities, annual income, net worth, tax con-
siderations, home ownership and financing, employee stock options, in-
surance, liquidity needs);
• Fundamental analysis of financial statements and types of financial 
statements included in an annual report, importance of footnotes, materi-
al risk disclosures, and key terms;
• Types of stock (e.g., authorized, issued, outstanding, Treasury stock, 
stated value);
• Characteristics and rights of common stock and preferred stock;
• Warrants and options;
• Tax treatment of securities transactions (e.g., capital gains and losses, 
dividend distributions, holding periods, determination of net long-term 
and short-term gains or losses);
• Types of debt securities; and
• Investment companies.
The Series 7 exam consists of 125 multiple choice items and candidates have 
225 minutes to complete it.116 They take the exam at one of many Prometric 
test centers.117 In order to pass, candidates must score at least 72%.118 It costs 
$245 to sit for the exam.119
B. How Venture Capitalists Invest
Not all exempt offerings will be structured the same way.  However, if we 
assumed that all issuers participating in exempt offerings were VC-backed 
companies, business organizations and financings would resemble each other.  
This is because a VC-backed company is likely to use:
• The Delaware corporation entity form;120
115. See FINRA, General Securities Representative Qualification Examination (Series 7) –
Content Outline, https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Series_7_Content_Outline.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2019).
116. See supra note 99.
117. See Schedule an Exam, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/industry/schedule-exam (last vis-
ited Sept. 5, 2019).
118. See supra note 99.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS: BE SMARTER THAN 
YOUR LAWYER AND VENTURE CAPITALIST 207 (3d ed. 2016) (“If you are going to raise VC or an-
gel money, a C Corp is the best (and often required) structure,” concluding “we always encourage 
Delaware as the default case.”).
Spring 2020] Redefining Accredited Investor 193
• Two tiers of stock;121
• Standard seed financings structures and documents;122
• Standard VC deal terms and documents;123 and
• Rule 506 exemptions.124
In fact, the standardization of deal structures, documents, and terms in the VC 
ecosystem has inspired the creation of some incredible resources, including:
• General and comprehensive summaries related to VC investing;125
• Entity formation-related documents;126
• Seed financing documents;127
• VC financing documents;128
• Document generators that create sets of formation and financing-
related documents;129
• Deal term summaries and trends (e.g., with respect to valuations and 
frequency of specific deal terms);130 and
121. See, e.g., CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE 
TO LAW AND STRATEGY 96 (5th ed. 2018) (“Unlike the founders and other employees, venture capi-
tal investors usually acquire preferred, not common, stock.”); see also Ronald J. Gilson & David M. 
Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred 
Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2003).
122. See, e.g., BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 121, at 438 (stating “very early-stage fi-
nancings (generally under $2 million) are often done through the issuance of convertible notes and, 
occasionally, SAFEs. A Simple Agreement for Future Equity (SAFE) is similar to a convertible 
note, but without a maturity date and interest.”). These seed financings, which occur before venture 
capitalists invest in their initial (i.e., Series A) round, may include investors who are friends and 
family of the company’s founders, accelerator programs, and angel investors. Series Seed stock is 
another structure used for seed financings. See id. at 455 (“Increasingly, companies are choosing to 
start with a ‘Series Seed Preferred Stock’ (also called ‘Seed Series’) round before the ‘A’ round.”).
123. See, e.g., FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 120, at 2 (“[D]efinitive documents have be-
come more standard over time. Whether it is the Internet age that has spread information across the 
ecosystem or clients growing tired of paying legal bills, there are more similarities in the documents 
today than ever before. As a result, we can lend you our experience in how venture financings are 
usually done.”).
124. See supra Part II.A.
125. See, e.g., FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 122; see also, COOLEY GO,
https://www.cooleygo.com/.
126. See, e.g., STARTUP FORMS LIBRARY, http://www.orrick.com/Total-Access/Tool-
Kit/Start-Up-Forms (last visited Sept. 4, 2019).
127. See, e.g., Series Seed Convertible Note Financing Package, COOLEY GO,
https://www.cooleygo.com/documents/series-seed-notes-financing-package/ (last visited Sept. 4, 
2019); see also Carolynn Levy, Safe Financing Documents, Y COMBINATOR (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/; SERIES SEED, https://www.seriesseed.com/ (last visited 
Sept. 4, 2019). 
128. See, e.g., Model Legal Documents, NVCA, http://www.nvca.org/resources/model-legal-
documents/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
129. See, e.g., Index of Cooley Go Docs Document Generators, COOLEY GO,
https://www.cooleygo.com/documents/index-document-generators/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2019).
130. See, e.g., Trends, COOLEY GO, https://www.cooleygo.com/trends/ (last visited Sept. 4, 
2019).
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• Comprehensive platforms that help with human resource, equity man-
agement, fundraising, and corporate governance needs.131
These standards and resources make for excellent teaching and testing materials 
for students and practitioners.132 However, as inferred from the list of standards 
and resources, the pertinent issues differ from those studied in traditional fi-
nance courses133 and are, in many ways, law heavy.134
Yes, it is inaccurate to assume all companies will be VC-backed.  However, 
if exempt offering investment experience is truly valuable, the AI exam should 
cover what VCs do.135 They are the professionals in the exempt offering space.  
Moreover, they act differently than investors in more established firms.  Not on-
ly do they utilize standard structures, documents, and terms, they have unique 
approaches when selecting investments.136 Among other things, they rely more 
heavily on qualitative factors and less heavily on things like cash flow analy-
sis.137
131. See, e.g., SHOOBX, https://www.shoobx.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2019).
132. While this Part IV.B focuses on VC investments in startups and other high-growth ven-
tures, exempt offerings will also include investment funds. For example, AIs will invest in angel 
funds, VC funds, other private equity funds, and even hedge funds. See, e.g., Finger, supra note 10,
at 734. Similar to the VC-backed companies covered in Part IV.B, these funds have standard deal 
structures, documents and terms. For example, the process usually involves: (i) an offering docu-
ment, (ii) a Delaware limited partnership agreement, (iii) a subscription agreement, and (iv) an in-
vestor questionnaire – and similar background laws. See Fundamentals of Private Equity Fund 
Formation, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/special-
topics/vcpefdeskbook/appendices/vcpefdeskbook_appendix-fundamentalsoffundformation.ashx. 
Further, these funds utilize similar fee structures whereby the fund charges an annual management 
fee (e.g., 2.5%) on the committed capital amount as well as a carry, which is a share (e.g., 20%) of 
the fund’s profits.
133. See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers et al., How Do Venture Capitalists Make Decisions?, 135 J.
FIN. ECON. 169, 170–71 (2020) (“The paucity of historical operating information and the uncertain-
ty of future cash flows makes VCs’ investment decisions difficult and less like those in the typical 
setting taught in MBA finance curricula.”).
134. Thus, attorneys and legal educators are rightfully active in the VC education space. See, 
e.g., UC Berkeley and NVCA Launch VC University, A New Educational Program Providing Online 
and Live Events for the U.S. Entrepreneurial Ecosystem, NVCA (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://nvca.org/pressreleases/uc-berkeley-nvca-launch-vc-university-new-educational-program-
providing-online-live-events-u-s-entrepreneurial-ecosystem/ (“The University of California, Berke-
ley, School of Law, through its Startup@BerkeleyLaw initiative, and the National Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA) are delighted to announce their partnership and launch of VC University, an 
educational program providing practical training on venture finance for entrepreneurs, investors, 
attorneys and others interested in emerging company finance.”).
135. Regardless of whether an existing exam is used (or modified), or an entirely new exam is 
created, the AI exam should acknowledge unique aspects of early stage investing and focus on 
prevalent deal structures, documents, and terms.
136. See Gompers et al., supra note 133, at 180 (“Overall, VC firms as a class appear to make 
decisions in a way that is inconsistent with predictions and recommendations of finance theory. Not 
only do they adjust for idiosyncratic risk and neglect market risk, 23% of them use the same metric 
for all investments, even though it seems likely that different investments face different risks.”).
137. Id. at 170–71 (“[I]n selecting investments, VCs place the greatest importance on the 
management/founding team. The management team was mentioned most frequently both as an im-
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The NVCA’s Series A Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (NVCA’s 
SPA) also sheds light on specific things VCs look for when making an invest-
ment.138 Before putting their money into companies, VCs require the compa-
nies to make certain representations and warranties, which are facts and assur-
ances about the business.139 VCs can more easily bring a breach claim if the 
representations and warranties prove to be untrue.  The NVCA’s SPA has ap-
proximately 30 representations and warranties that address particular areas, in-
cluding:140
• The company is in good standing and has the appropriate corporate 
powers;141
• The company’s capitalization is as stated (e.g., the numbers of author-
ized, reserved and issued shares of stock, and options to acquire stock, 
are provided—as are the related vesting schedules and purchase pric-
es);142
• The company is not involved in any lawsuit, arbitration, or similar ac-
tion;143
• The company owns or possesses the intellectual property it needs to 
conduct its current and proposed business;144
• The financial statements delivered by the company were prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and fairly 
present the financial condition and operating results of the compa-
ny;145 and
• The company employs the stated number of full-time and part-time 
employees.146
If these representations and warranties (or accompanying Disclosure Schedule) 
expose problems, VCs may (a) decide not to invest, (b) negotiate a lower valua-
portant factor (by 95% of VC firms) and as the most important factor (by 47% of VC firms) . . . .
[F]ew VCs use discounted cash flow or net present value (NPV) techniques to evaluate their in-
vestments.”).
138. See Stock Purchase Agreement, NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, http://www.nvca.org/
resources/model-legal-documents/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2019).
139. Id. at 6, n.20 (“The purpose of the Company’s representations is primarily to create a 
mechanism to ensure full disclosure about the Company’s organization, financial condition and 
business to the investors. The Company is required to list any deviations from the representations on 
a Disclosure Schedule, the preparation and review of which drives the due diligence process on both 
sides of the deal . . . . Some practitioners prefer to deliver the Disclosure Schedule separately, in-
stead of as an exhibit to the Stock Purchase Agreement, so that the Disclosure Schedule will not 
have to be publicly filed in the event the Stock Purchase Agreement is filed as an exhibit to a public 
offering registration statement.”).
140. Id. at §§ 2.1–2.33.
141. Id. at § 2.1.
142. Id. at § 2.2.
143. Id. at § 2.7.
144. Id. at § 2.8.
145. Id. at § 2.14.
146. Id. at § 2.16.
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tion, or (c) accept the risk.  When making investments, VCs also insist their pre-
ferred stock receive special rights, when compared to the issuer’s common 
stock.  These special rights may include economic rights, control rights, and in-
formation rights.147
By encouraging individuals to think like VCs, the AI exam would not only 
help assess potential AIs, but would also educate non-VC investors and help 
develop a stronger exempt offering ecosystem.  Stated differently, if VCs are 
the pros at investing in exempt offerings, others should benefit from learning 
what the VCs know and do – and they should either copy them or understand 
why and how their deals are different.  For example, an individual contemplat-
ing an investment in a company that has no intentions of raising VC would still 
benefit from having an understanding of deal structures, documents, and terms 
commonly used in the VC ecosystem.  For instance, while not all investors will 
be able to get companies to give them each of the representations and warranties 
in the NVCA’s SPA, they should still know what questions to ask and make ap-
propriate adjustments based on answers they receive (or fail to get).148 There-
fore, while all investors may not have a VC’s leverage, much less the ability to 
protect against every risk, a strong AI exam should empower them to identify 
risks they might not otherwise spot – and this provides much value.
C. Spotting and Dealing with Gaps
The concept of using the AI exam to empower investors to spot risks, in-
cluding risks that cannot be eliminated, should be expanded further.  For exam-
ple, the AI exam should not attempt to cover every applicable market in which 
investors might put their money (e.g., cannabis, artificial intelligence, financial 
services, software, biotechnology).  Among other things, the AI exam would 
become too long.  Instead, it should inform investors that it does not attempt to 
cover market-specific issues, and thus there will be gaps investors need to ad-
dress (e.g., by independently learning about the market-specific issues and/or 
seeking out experts in the applicable area(s) for help).  Similarly, the AI exam 
should not try to turn every investor into a tax or legal expert – but it should 
alert investors to pertinent issues and empower them to know when to seek out 
professional help and where to find it.  The AI exam can also ensure investors 
comprehend common risk factors (including the risk of complete loss), liquidity 
challenges, and suggested investment limits associated with exempt offerings.  
Again, instead of trying to eliminate all applicable risks, the AI exam will pre-
pare investors to spot risks, mitigate some risks (e.g., by learning more and/or 
seeking help), and deal with remaining risks (e.g., by adhering to reasonable in-
vestment limits).
147. See, e.g., FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 120, at 38, 87–88 (and generally).
148. Other tools can also help investors consider relevant issues and identify potential risks. 
See, e.g., Form U7 (SCOR), North American Securities Adm’rs. Assoc. (May 19, 2019), 
https://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/uniform-forms/.
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D. Linking the Exam to Investment Limits and Relevant Experience
Even with a good AI exam, there is still concern that investors may not be 
able to bear the loss of their investments.  That is, some people will invest (and 
eventually lose) too much.  Some commentators argue that imposing investment 
limits is too parental and administratively difficult.149 Others even take the po-
sition that consenting adults should simply be permitted to opt into AI status so 
long as they are warned about the risks.150 While it seems appropriate to have 
some safeguards in place to protect investors from losing too much, perhaps it is 
proper to trust (and remind) people who pass the AI exam to not invest too 
much.  More specifically, after they pass an exam that covers (among other 
things) the risks of complete loss and appropriate investment amounts, success-
ful test takers could be required to certify they will not invest more than X% of 
the greater of their income or net worth in exempt offerings.151 Moreover, these 
investors could be required to recertify their investment limit pledge each time 
they renew their AI license. Suggestions for an easily searchable central data-
base (identifying individuals who passed the exam), license numbers, and re-
newal requirements (such as CPE) have previously been made.152 The database 
and renewal procedures could also be used to report and audit exempt offering 
investments made by AI licensees, especially if self-certifications alone prove to 
be insufficient.  Further, if exempt offering investment activity is being reported 
by AIs and the SEC desires to recognize or reward AIs for acquiring experience 
making these investments,153 an AI’s percentage limitation could increase (e.g.,
from X% to Y%) once the AI reports sufficient exempt offering experience.154
The AI licensee database could also include individuals who are AIs because of 
the Net Wealth and/or Income Thresholds.  Some current AIs do not want to 
share tax returns or similar information currently used to satisfy the AI safe har-
bor for Rule 506(c) offerings.155 If a database and licensee number system is 
already established for AI exam takers, other (i.e., current) AIs could provide 
their information to just one party, get added to the database, and then use the 
licensee number when making investments; therefore protecting their private 
information.  Given these enhancements and its relatively low initial and ongo-
149. See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, supra note 1
at 30,475, 30,476 n.125.
150. In fact, the SEC is asking whether individuals should be able to opt into AI status, after 
receiving disclosures about risks. See id. at 30,469–78.
151. Whereby X could equal 10, for instance, to mirror limits on non-AIs under Tier 1 offer-
ings under Regulation A. See supra Part II.A.
152. See, e.g., Finger, supra note 10, at 762–63.
153. Supra note 87.
154. For instances, an investment limit of 10% (of the greater of income or net worth) could 
increase to 15% once an AI reports making 10 or more exempt offering investments of at least 
$1,000.
155. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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ing disclosure requirements, Rule 506(c) could eliminate the need for Regula-
tion A and/or Regulation CF.
CONCLUSION
New ventures move our economy.  Most of these ventures need additional 
capital to grow.  They raise this capital through exempt offerings, and exempt 
offerings are essentially limited by the pool of AIs.  Natural persons must meet 
either the Net Worth Threshold or Income Threshold to be considered AIs.  Be-
cause of this, AIs make up only 13% of U.S. households, and only a small frac-
tion of these households actually invest in exempt offerings.  There is consensus 
that it is time to consider criteria besides net worth and income.  Expanding the 
AI population by welcoming people who pass a relevant exam is a responsible 
way to increase the number of AIs.  Even if no other laws or rules change, the 
AI exam would help ensure investor protection while generating more invest-
ment alternatives for individuals, additional capital for new ventures, and in-
creased liquidity for the market.  For example, Rule 506(c) offerings already 
preempt state law.  They also permit advertising, so long as all actual sales are 
to AIs.  Rule 506(c) offerings are also less burdensome/costly than Regulation 
A and Regulation CF offerings.  Thus, Rule 506(c) could provide a clean prima-
ry offering exemption that connects large crowds of new AIs (individuals who 
pass the AI exam) to businesses seeking capital.  Further, secondary market li-
quidity would be improved under the existing Section 4(a)(7), since the AI ex-
am would increase the number of purchasers eligible under the resale exemp-
tion.  Like Rule 506(c), Section 4(a)(7) already preempts state law.  Therefore, 
these two existing exemptions already provide a powerful primary-secondary 
combo ready to welcome individuals who pass the AI exam.  So yes, simply 
taking the small step of redefining AI to include people who pass a relevant ex-
am would be a giant leap for our economy.  However, it may be time to aim 
higher – to shoot for the stars.
A few additional changes could transform the above primary-secondary 
combo into an even more harmonized framework of exemptions—one that is 
revolutionary.  For example, the following two additional changes could inspire 
a cost-effective public offering alternative for companies and AIs: (i) allow ad-
vertising in connection with Section 4(a)(7) resales, so long as all resales are to 
AIs and (ii) exclude AIs from holder of record counts that might otherwise trig-
ger registration under the Exchange Act.  The first change should substantially 
increase liquidity for exempt securities and enable a robust secondary market.  
Moreover, making the first change seems reasonable, particularly since Rule 
506(c) already allows advertising to everyone, so long as actual sales are only to 
AIs.  Thus, the change would actually result in Section 4(a)(7) being more con-
sistent with Rule 506(c).  The second change would permit companies to stay 
private longer (perhaps forever); since they could, in theory, have an unlimited 
number of AIs (instead of having to register under the Exchange Act, and incur 
the associated costs, when they have either 2,000 persons or 500 persons who 
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are not AIs).  While this would empower some companies to avoid going public 
altogether, investors who can fend for themselves would still have additional 
investment opportunities – and they can get in earlier (at a lower cost) and thus 
realize gains currently reserved for individuals meeting the Net Worth or In-
come Thresholds.  Just changing the AI definition has proven to be challenging.  
Thus, perhaps making that change alone should be the initial goal.  However, if 
we could put a man on the moon 50 years ago, we should now be able to make a 
few additional changes to create a harmonized framework of exemptions—a
framework that creates even more investment options, even more capital for 
new ventures, and even more of an economic impact.
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